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PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ^ CHOICE OF LAW ^ ISLAMIC LAW
Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v Beximco and others
[2004] EWCACiv19, English Court of Appeal
The facts
The claimant bank applied for summary judgment in its action against the defendants on the basis of
certain financing agreementsmade between the bank and the defendants.The underlying agreement
was described as a `Morabaha' agreement, under Sharia law, the essential characteristics of which
were that the bank as seller undertook to acquire possession of goods that it agreed to sell to the
defendants as purchaser by instalments, with the addition of a pre-fixedprofit.The agreement stated
that s`ubject to principles of Glorious Sharia' the English court shall have jurisdiction to resolve
disputes under the contract. The bank (S) claimed amounts outstanding under the agreements
when Beximco (B) failed to make payments.
B's defence was that, on the proper construction of the governing law clause, the agreements were
only enforceable in so far as they were valid in accordance with Sharia law and in accordance with
English law, and that the agreements were in fact contrary to Sharia law. B's case was that (1) the
guarantors were discharged if the principal debtors were discharged; alternatively (2) the
guarantees had been entered into on the basis of a common mistake as to the validity of the
agreements under Sharia law and were therefore of no effect. It was also raised in argument that
certain parts of the agreement were contrary to Islamic principles because they were in fact
disguised loans with interest.
The trial judge held that English law was the governing law because there could not be two separate
systems of law governing the contracts.The parties had not chosen Sharia law as the governing law
because itwas not the lawof a country and they could not have intended the secular English court to
resolvematters of religious controversy.
The decision
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
The court affirmed the view expressed by Morrison J that the commercial purpose of the contracts
was that there should be certainty in the applicable law of the contract. A contract cannot have two
competing governing laws in general.
The Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations scheduled to the Contracts
(Applicable Law) Act 1990 only contemplated and sanctioned the choice of the law of a country.
Sharia law does not refer to any particular country's laws; as such it falls outside the purview of the
1990Act.The courtwenton tohold that although itwaspossible to incorporateprovisions of foreign
law as terms of a contract, it is important for the reference to principles of Sharia law in the contract
to identify specific aspects of Sharia intended to be incorporated into the agreements.
The reference to Sharia law was thus repugnant to the choice of English law and could not sensiblybe
given effect to.The judge was right that the words were to be read as a reference to the fact that S
held itself out as conducting its affairs according to Sharia principles.The Court of Appeal also ruled
that a commonmistake as to the legal consequences of the agreements (as amatter of factbecause of
foreign law)wouldnotgive rise to a defence to the claims on the guarantees, because B's sole interest
was to obtain advances of funds and they were indifferent to the form of the agreements requiredby
the bank or the impact of Sharia law on their validity.There was thus no operative mistake (of fact)
that rendered t`he subject-matter of the contract essentially and radically different from the subject-
matter which the parties believed to exist' (per Lord Steyn in Associated Japanese Bank (International
Ltd) v Cre¨dit du Nord SA [1989] 1WLR 255 at 268) or that `the thing [contracted for] essentially
different from the thing [that] it was believed to be' (per Lord Atkin in Bell v Lever Bros Ltd [1932] AC
161, as adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Great Peace Shipping Ltd vTsavliris Salvage
(International) Ltd [2002] EWCACiv1407).
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Comment
This case is significant in that the Court of Appeal has affirmed the general thinking of commentators
that the applicable law of a contract, as provided for in the 1990 Act, must necessarily be that of a
country.Whilst it is possible in arbitration to rely on lexmercatoria, general principles of fair trading
etc, as far as judicial resolution of disputes is concerned, the applicable or governing law is that of a
specific and identifiable country. Indeed, Article 3(3) specifically refers to the law of a c`ountry' as
defined in Article 19(1). There is no provision in the Act for the choice or application of a non-
national system of law such as Sharia law. In any event, the principles of Sharia are not simply
principles of law but principles which apply to other aspects of life and behaviour. Even treating the
principles of Sharia as principles of law, the application of such principles in relation to matters of
commerce and banking would be subject to much controversy. In particular there is controversy as
to the strictness withwhich principles of Sharia law will be interpreted or applied. In consequence it
was highly improbable that the parties to the agreements could be said to have intended that Sharia
was to operate beyond a guide as to conduct and behaviour.
B's argumentwas that although therewas some controversy about the precise application and scope
of the rules of Sharia in the present context, there was nothing to prevent an English court
adjudicating on the advice of expert witnesses as to those aspects which were sufficiently clear to
help resolve the issue of whether the agreements were valid under Sharia law. However, as it was
not possible for the contract to adopt general principles of non-national law as the governing law,
there was no scope to deal with the argument raised. That is a little regrettable but quite
understandable ^ a little regrettable because the issue as to whether the agreements were
disguised loans with interest under Sharia law wouldmake for an interesting analysis.
It was also the position, not only under the common lawbut the RomeConvention, that a particular
contractual provision cannot be governed by two separate legal systems. This is different from
severance where different parts of the contract may be subject to different governing laws.
Severance is valid but as far as the Giuliano-Lagarde Report (the official explanatory report
accompanying the Rome Convention) is concerned, severance should be employed a`s seldom as
possible' and only `for part of a contract which is independent and separable, in terms of the
contract and not of the dispute' (OJ1980 C282/23).
The court was also quick to point out that B's conduct until the time of the claimwas such that they
did not seem to have any difficulty with the agreements on religious grounds or they intended to
challenge them on the basis of Sharia law. That would support the contention that the presumed
intention was that the agreements were for all intents and purposes to be legally enforceable under
English law.
It is important for parties intending to deal on Islamic principles to incorporate the law of an Islamic
country whichmost closely gives effect to those principles of Sharia that they are concernedwith. It
is neither enough to choose Sharia law per se, nor English law as guided by Sharia principles. It is
preferable, although not always offering better certainty, to adopt a clause which subjects certain
parts of the contract to, say, Saudi law and other parts to English law.
Another issue of some interest is the fact thatmany such financing agreements in theMiddle East and
elsewhere in the Islamic world, tend to requiremonitoringby an Islamic board (in thepresentcase, it
was the bank's own Religious Supervisory Board). It is clearly open to the parties to ensure that the
decisions and recommendationsmade by the Board be taken seriously by contractually providing for
appropriate sanctions; where Sharia principles are considered to be fundamental, the parties may
provide for a more active involvement of such a Board. In the present case, the system of
supervision was of little help because it was not the specific agreements which were subject to
religious supervision, only the general activities of the bank.The powers of the Board were set out
not in the financing agreements but in the bank's Articles of Association. Although it may not be in
some banks' interest to subject their financing and commercial transactions to detailed supervision,
that is an available and workable option for traders serious about the incorporation of Islamic
principles. The option is not entirely free from difficulties; there is much controversy over what
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financing or commercial arrangements are permitted by Sharia and also there is a potential problem
of conflict given that some of these Boards, as is the case here, are managed and run by the banks
themselves. In some countries (egMalaysia) the Board is state-regulated, making the decisions, to an
appreciable degree, more independent.
JC
MARINE INSURANCE ^ DUTYOF UTMOST GOOD FAITH ^
MISREPRESENTATION ^ PRE-CONTRACT ^ BREACH OF WARRANTY ^
FRAUDULENT PRESENTATION OF A CLAIM
Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Games Video Co SA and others (The Game Boy)
[2004] EWHC15; [2004] 1Lloyd's Rep 238
English Commercial Court
Facts
The insured vessel, the Game Boy, was lost on 13 January 1999 while she was moored at the Avlis
shipyard in Greece, as a result of the detonation of an explosive device at a point below the
waterline on her port side.The incident caused ingress of water which resulted in her sinking.
The Game Boy had a distinct and unusual history. She was built in Bulgaria in1965 as a naval training
ship for the Russian navy. She was brought to Greece in 1989 and soon after transferred into the
ownership of Seniorita Shipping. She was then laid up until steps were taken in 1993 to convert her
into a floating bar and discotheque.This venturewas not a success and it came to an end in late1994
when shewas arrested by creditors. Attempts weremade over the next few years to sell the vessel
by auction but on each occasion she failed to achieve her reserve price. She was still under arrest at
the time shewas identified as a suitablevesselby a Russianbusinessman,MrXirotiris, andhis business
associates in Greece to be used as a floating casino.
While negotiations for the purchase of the vessel continued, Mr Xirotiris set up a company,Games
Video Co. (GVC), and on 9 April1998 appointed Mr Ghiolman, a leading figure in the Greek tourist
business, asmanager in consideration of a 30 per cent shareholding in this company.Theplanwas that
GVCwould purchase the ship and Casinomar SA, an experienced casino operator, would operate a
casino onboard and fund some of theworkon thevesselwhichwas necessary to enable her to trade
as a floating casino.
The purchase was completed in June 1998 and the vessel was insured on 12 June 1998 in the sum of
US$1,800,000 for four months.The cover was subsequently extended to13 March1999.The policy,
interalia, contained an express warranty which read:
Warranted approval of Lay-up arrangements, Fire Fighting Provisions and all movements by Salvage
Association and all recommendations to be complied with prior to attachment.
In November1998 the insured vesselwas shifted to the Avlis Shipyardwhere she remained in the old
yard until being towed to the dry-dock area in December, where the loss took place.
The total loss claim subsequently presented was declined by underwriters. They commenced
proceedings to obtain declarations that they were not liable to their assureds and that the policy
had been validly avoided. Their primary case was that the value of the vessel had been knowingly
and fraudulently overstated. They, at the same time, raised a number of additional defences,
including allegations ofbreaches of warranty and an allegation of fraudulentpresentation of the claim.
Decision
(1) The court concluded that the assureds had no genuine belief that the value of the vessel was
US$1,800,000. In reality, she was not worth more than the scrap value of approximately
US$100,000 to US$150,000 and the assureds were aware of this. In the light of this finding, the
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